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I. INTRODUCTION
The Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation 40/94 on
the Community trade mark on the twentieth of December 1993.1 The
purpose of this regulation was to promote the harmonious development and
expansion of economic activities in the European Union's internal market
by offering conditions similar to those of national markets.2  Striking
similarities exist in the purpose of this regulation, which provides an
overarching trademark scheme for a collection of member states with their
own trademark laws, and that of the trademark law of the United States,
with a parallel overarching trademark scheme for a collection of states
having their own laws on unfair competition. Striking disparities between
the trademark laws of the United States and Europe exist in the treatment of
proposed verbal marks based on the respective interpretations of the
distinctive nature of these marks in a linguistic context.
This Comment will examine the similarities and differences between
these trademark protection laws with regard to the multi-cultural nature of
the consuming public of the European Union and that of the United States,
and then will recommend ways in which the laws can be harmonized to
promote the congruent development and expansion of economic activities
globally. This harmonization is necessary in light of the interplay between
these schemes for protection of marks and the protection provided under the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,3 the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks4, and the
1. Council Regulation 40/94, 1994 O.J. (LI 1) 1 [hereinafter CTMR]. Specific articles
from the CTMR will be cited as Article XX CTMR, where XX is replaced by the article number.
2. Id.
3. PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, Mar. 20,
1883, 37 Stat. 1645 [hereinafter PARIS CONVENTION].
4. MADRID AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION OF
MARKS, Apr. 14, 1891, 23 U.S.T. 1353. The United States is not a contracting country
for this agreement.
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Madrid Protocol.5 The dependence of international protection of a mark
registered under the Madrid Protocol upon the validity of the mark in its
country of origin6 argues for a similar treatment of validity of the mark in all
countries of origin.
II. THE COMMUNITY TRADE MARK
Community trade mark laws are laid out in Council Regulation 40/94.7
To administrate the Community trade mark, the Office for Harmonization in
the Internal Market (trade marks and designs) (OHIM) was established.8
OHIM examines marks for which Community trade mark registration is
sought for compliance with the requirements of Community trade marks,9
publishes marks that are eligible for registration, 10 decides oppositions to
5. PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MADRID AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE
INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION OF MARKS, June 28, 1989, WIPO Pub. No. 204(E),
available at http://wipo.org/eng/iplex/index.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
MADRID PROTOCOL]. Membership in the Madrid Protocol treaty seems imminent for the
United States. Bruce A. McDonald, International Intellectual Property Rights, 35 INT'L
LAW. 465, 471 (2001). The granting of the advice and consent of the Senate to the
Madrid Protocol was recommended by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
November 14, 2001. Barbara Grahn, The Madrid Protocol-Are We Finally There?, 20
IPL NEWSLETTER 45 (Winter 2002). The House passed The Madrid Protocol
Implementation Act on March 14, 2001; this act is awaiting Senate approval. Id.
6. See MADRID PROTOCOL, supra note 5, art. 6(3). This Article prevents invocation of
international protection in the case of marks that have been cancelled, revoked, or rejected in
the country of origin during the first five years of registration under the protocol. Id. Article 5
of the Protocol allows contracting parties to refuse protection to a mark based on the grounds
of the Paris Convention (lack of distinctiveness amongst others). Id. art. 5(1); PARIS
CONVENTION, supra note 3, art. 6 quinquies. Disparate treatment of distinctiveness under the
Community Trade Mark law and United States Trademark law could result in a situation
where a mark with an origin outside of the European Union (the United States for example)
could be denied protection by the Community as a whole, but would be provided protection
by the individual member states.
7. CTMR, supra note 1. This regulation was modified by Council Regulation
3288/94, 1994 O.J. (L349) 83, to comply with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay round
Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. The implementing rules for the
Community trade mark were laid out in Commission Regulation 2868/95, 1995 OJ (L
303) 1 [hereinafter IR]. Specific rules from the IR will be cited as Rule XX IR, where
XX is replaced by the rule number.
8. Article 2 CTMR.
9. Articles 36-39 CTMR; Rules 9-11 IR. These examinations are conducted in
accordance with a set of examination guidelines adopted by OHIM in 1996. Examination
Guidelines, 1996 O.J. OHIM 1324, available at http://oani.eu.int/en/marque/directives/exam.htm
(Mar. 26, 1996) [hereinafter Examination Guidelines].
10. Articles 40-41 CTMR; Rule 12 IR.
registration," and either registers or refuses to register the marks. 2 If
OHIM refuses to register a mark, this refusal may be appealed to a Board
of Appeal within OHIM.13 Additionally, OHIM considers revocation or
invalidity of registered marks when challenged.' 4  The results of these
proceedings may also be appealed to a Board of Appeal. 5 Adverse
decisions by the Board of Appeals may be appealed to the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities.'
6
III. GROUNDS FOR REFUSAL OF COMMUNITY TRADE MARK
REGISTRATION
Registration of a mark may be refused on the basis of two broad
categories of reasons, those that are absolute grounds for refusal 17 and
those that are relative grounds for refusal.18 The relative grounds for
refusal are based on a comparison of the mark with earlier trade marks,
which are defined to include Community trade marks, trade marks of
Member States,' 9 trade marks registered under international arrangements
having effect in a Member State, applications for such trade marks, and
trade marks that are well-known in a Member State.20 This comparison is
made only upon opposition of the registration by the proprietor of the
earlier mark, and will preclude the registration of marks that are identical
or sufficiently similar to the earlier mark to present a likelihood of
confusion on the part of the consuming public for the earlier mark.2'
The Community Trade Mark Regulation provides a listing of the• 22
absolute grounds for refusal to register a trade mark. Applications for
marks are examined with regard to these grounds during the examination
process.23 It is in the absolute grounds for refusal that the linguistic and
multicultural aspects of the Union become apparent.
11. Articles 42-43 CTMR; Rules 15-22 IR.
12. Articles 36.4, 37.1, 38.1,43.5, 45 CTMR; Rule 23 IR.
13. Articles 57-62 CTMR; Rules 48-51 IR; Commission Regulation 216/96, 1996
o.J. (L28) 11.
14. Articles 55-56 CTMR; Rules 37-41 IR.
15. Articles 57-62 CTMR; Rules 15-22 IR.
16. Council Decision 99/951/ECSC, Euratom of 24 October 1988 Establishing a
Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 1988 O.J. (L319); 1989 O.J. (L241).
17. Article 7 CTMR.
18. Article 8 CTMR.
19. This category includes trade marks registered with the Benelux Trade Mark
Office for Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Article 8.2.(a)(ii) CTMR.
20. Article 8.2 CTMR. The use of the phrase "well-known" in this regulation is
defined as being identical to that of the Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, supra note
3, at 6bis. Article 8.2.(c) CTMR.
21. Article 8.1 CTMR.
22. Article 7 CTMR.
23. Article 38 CTMR.
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The first of the absolute grounds for refusal of registration is that the sign
sought to be registered as a Community trade mark is incapable of either
being rendered graphically, or of distinguishing the goods or services of one
source from those of another.24 The Examination Guidelines discuss the
issue of graphical rendering of the signs, but provide no insight into the
criteria regarding a sign's capability to distinguish goods or services.
25
The Examination Guidelines seem deficient in their discussion of the next
absolute grounds for refusal of registration, the lack of any distinctive
character of the mark.26 Under the Community Trade Mark Regulation, this
ground for refusal is treated as a separate consideration from considerations
of descriptiveness, customariness, and deceptiveness, which are discussed
below.27 One author has highlighted this as a difference between the law on
Community trade marks and national trade mark laws,2 8 but this
interpretation focuses solely on the application of distinctiveness to word
marks. A word mark that is customary or descriptive is considered devoid
of distinctive character,29 but not all marks that are devoid of distinctive
character are either customary or descriptive word marks.
30
24. Articles 4, 7.1 (a) CTMR. Article 4 actually defines signs that may constitute
Community trade marks, while Article 7.1 (a) provides that signs not meeting this criteria
shall not be registered; hence, the odd construction of this rule. Id. Although listed as an
absolute ground for refusal, this seems to include the relative grounds for refusal, which
are only applied upon opposition. Article 8 CTMR. The identity or similarity between a
proposed mark and an earlier trade mark would render the proposed mark incapable of
distinguishing the goods or services of the two undertakings.
25. Examination Guidelines, supra note 9, at para. 8.2. The guidelines do suggest
that a sound that could be considered capable of graphical representation by musical
notation would be acceptable, but do not address signs targeting the other non-visual
senses of smell and taste. Id.
26. Examination Guidelines, supra note 9, at para. 8.3; See also, Article 7.1(b) CTMR.
27. Article 7.1(b) CTMR.
28. ERIc GASTRUEL & MARK MILFORD, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE COMMUNITY
TRADE MARK 71 (2001). Gastruel and Milford use the term generic instead of
customary. Id. The term customary will be used in this Comment to follow the
terminology of Article 7(l)(d) CTMR and to distinguish this type of mark from a mark
that "become[s] the common name in the trade for a product or service in respect of
which it is registered." Article 50(1)(b) CTMR. This second type of mark could also be
considered generic, and would be revoked under this Article. Id. The need for this
distinction is the ability under the CTMR for acquired distinctiveness to overcome the
customary nature of a mark. Article 7(3) CTMR.
29. This is evident from the example provided by the Examination Guidelines of
the word "wine" as used with respect to the product wine. Examination Guidelines,
supra note 9, at para. 8.3. The word in this context is devoid of distinctive character
because it is customary or descriptive.
30. The Examination Guidelines provide the additional examples of simple
designs (circles or squares), primary colors, and marks consisting of one or two letters or
The descriptive nature of a mark is the third absolute grounds for refusal.
The regulation prohibits the registration of marks that may serve to
designate the characteristics of the goods or services. 31 Related to this
prohibition is the prohibition of registration for the customary nature of
a mark. Customary marks are marks that "have become customary in
the current language or... the bona fide and established practices of the
trade. 32 This category'of prohibited marks extends beyond word marks
alone to include images of grape bunches and leaves from grape vines on
wine bottles.33
These grounds for refusal of registration, and the effect of the
multilingual character of the European Union will be the focus of this
Comment for comparison with the parallel treatments of the trademark
law of the United States.34 The linguistic effect on Community trade
marks is magnified by the regulations provision that the grounds for
refusal apply despite their existence in only a portion of the Community.
35
numbers as marks that are devoid of distinctive character. Id. at para. 8.3. Although the
numbers may be descriptive of the quantity of a good, this is not necessarily the case, but
depends on the usage. In addition, the deceptive quality of a word mark does not
actually make the mark devoid of distinctive character because of the mark's deceptive
quality. The deceptive nature would logically require the conveyance of some
information by the mark about the product, which would necessitate that the mark be
customary, descriptive, or possibly suggestive. Although suggestive marks are generally
considered distinctive, a mark that suggests information of a deceptive nature would be
refused registration on the grounds of its deceptive nature. Article 7.1(g) CTMR;
Examination Guidelines, supra note 9, at para. 8.8.
31. Article 7.1(c) CTMR. This regulation specifically cites the "kind, quality,
quantity, intended purpose, value, geographic origin or the time of production of the
goods or of rendering of the service." Id. The regulation includes a catchall category for
other characteristics. Id. The prohibition on registration applies only to marks that
consist exclusively of descriptive elements. Id. The descriptive nature of the mark is to
be determined in relation to the trade in the goods or services to which the mark relates.
Examination Guidelines, supra note 9, at para. 8.4.1.
32. Article 7.1(d) CTMR.
33. Examination Guidelines, supra note 9, at para. 8.5. As with descriptiveness as
a ground for refusal, customariness is examined in the context of the trade. Id. This
examination is expanded to include uses of words in the current language as well, an
aspect not covered in the Examination Guidelines. See Id.; Article 7.1 (d) CTMR.
34. The regulation prohibits registration for several other grounds for which the
effect of a multicultural society is less noticeable, including certain shapes, public policy
and morality, deceptiveness, certain emblems, certain hallmarks, and deceptive
geographic origin designation for wines or spirits. Articles 7.1(e)-(j) CTMR.
35. Article 7.2 CTMR. The regulation contains an additional provision allowing
for acquisition of distinctiveness through use to overcome the prohibition of lack of a
distinctive character, descriptiveness or customariness of a mark. Article 7.3 CTMR.
Article 7.2 of the regulation applies to acquired distinctiveness as well.
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IV. LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF COMMUNITY TRADE MARK EXAMINATION
The multiplicity of official languages of the European Union
36
necessitates an examination of the treatment of language within OHIM.
There are five languages of OHIM, English, French, German, Italian,
and Spanish.37 Applications for Community trade marks may be filed in
any of the official languages of the European Union, but must specify an
alternate language, which must be a language of OHIM. 38  If
applications are filed in a language other than those of OHIM, they are
translated into the alternate language specified.39  The language of
proceedings in which the applicant is the sole party is the language of
the application;40 for proceedings involving additional parties, the
language of proceedings is either the language of the application or the
alternate language, but in either case will be a language of OHIM.41
V. COMMUNITY TRADE MARK LAW APPLIED
Representative cases involving the application of the Community Trade
Mark Regulation are analyzed in depth in Appendix 1. In summary, the
Court of First Instance treats the issues of distinctiveness and
descriptiveness of a proposed mark as separate considerations. Marks that
are refused registration on grounds of a lack of distinctiveness based on
descriptiveness alone, will be allowed registration if the descriptiveness is
disproved. 42 Some overlap between descriptiveness and distinctiveness
does exist, as demonstrated in the assessment of distinctiveness in relation
to the goods or services for which registration is requested.43
36. At present there are twelve official languages in the European Union, eleven of
which are actually used. RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 99 (3d ed. 1999).
Gaelic is the unused language. Id.
37. Article 115.2 CTMR.
38. Article 115 CTMR.
39. Id.
40. Id. Although the language of the proceedings is the language of the
application, OHIM is permitted to send written communications to the applicant in the
alternate language if the language of the application is not one of OHIM. Id.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Case T-87/00, Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG v. OHIM, [2000]
E.C.R. 11-1259, [2001] CEC (CCH) 73.
43. Case T-19/99 Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG v. OHIM, [2000] E.C.R. 11-1,
par. 24, [2000] 1 C.M.L.R. 508; Case T-360/99, Community Concepts AG v. OHIM, [2001]
E.T.M.R. 17, para. 21. The basis for this assessment is questionable. Article 4 CTMR includes
the requirement that a sign be "capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one
undertaking from those of other undertakings." Article 4 CTMR. This is interpreted as implying
519
Proposed marks are examined for descriptiveness simultaneously in
virtually all of the languages of the community.44 This examination is
accomplished without translation of the mark into any specific language,
and may take into consideration the understanding of the original language
of the mark by non-native speakers of that language.45
Proposed marks are examined for distinctiveness with respect to the
goods or services for which registration is sought.46 A mark may lack
distinctiveness when it consists of a combination of words in a language of
the Community when these words are commonly used with reference to the
goods or services.47 This may result despite a lack of descriptiveness of the
resulting combination.48
VI. REGISTRATION OF TRADEMARKS IN THE UNITED STATES
The Trademark Act of 1946 governs registration of trademarks in the
United States.49 Sections 2 and 3 of the Act provide grounds for refusal of
registration that parallel many of the grounds of the Community Trade
Mark Regulation. Section 2 starts with the provision that "[n]o trademark
by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of
others shall be refused registration.., on account of its nature unless" the
grounds for refusal laid out in subsections (a) through (e) are present.51 This
provision, extended to service marks by Section 3,52 is the equivalent of the
requirements of Article 4 CTMR for Community trade marks.
53
that distinctiveness must be assessed with respect to the signs ability to distinguish the goods or
services for which it is to be used. E.g., Case T-19/99 Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG v.
OHIM, [2000] E.C.R. 1-1, para. 24, [200011 C.M.L.R. 508. The problem with this interpretation
is that if the sign were not capable of distinguishing these goods or services, it would not meet
the requirements of Article 4 CTMR as the cases interpret the Article. Id. This would render the
proposed mark non-registrable under Article 7(1)(a) CTMR. The absolute grounds of refusal of
Article 7(l)(a) CTMR may not be overcome by acquisition of distinctiveness, which may be
accomplished in the case of a sign which is devoid of distinctive character under Article 7(l)(b)
CTMR. Article 7(3) CTMIR. Of course, the use of a mark that is already in use by another
undertaking would be incapable of distinguishing the goods or services of the two undertakings.
Registration of such a mark is prohibited by Article 8(l)(a) CTMR. The above interpretation of
Article 4 CTMR would render this mark prohibited by Article 7(l)(a) CTMR as well, thus
rendering a relative grounds for refusal into an absolute grounds for refusal.
44. E.g., Case T-135/99, Taurus-Film GmbH & Co. v. OHIM, [2001] E.C.R. 11-379.
45. See id.; Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG, supra note 42.
46. E.g., Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG, supra note 43, at para. 26.
47. E.g., Community Concepts AG, supra note 43, at para. 22.
48. See id.
49. Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (1994, Supp. IV 1998, & Supp. V 1999).
50. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052-53.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1053. Section 45 defines trademarks and service marks as words,
names, symbols, or devices used for goods or services respectively. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
53. Article 7(l)(a) CTMR has no explicit parallel in the Trademark Act; the
equivalent requirements are implied. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052.
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Section 2(e)(1) prohibits the registration of marks that are "merely
descriptive" of the goods,54 while Section 2(e)(2) prohibits the registration
of geographically descriptive marks. These sections combined are the
equivalent of the absolute grounds of refusal of Article 7(1)(c) CTMR.56 As
in the Community trade mark, descriptiveness may be overcome by a
showing of acquired distinctiveness.
57
There is no separate restriction under the Trademark Act for marks
that are devoid of distinctive character. 8 This restriction may have a
parallel in the requirement that the mark be able to distinguish the
goods.59 The difference between this form of non-distinctiveness and
the lack of a distinctive character under the CTMR is that acquired
distinctiveness cannot be demonstrated under the Trademark Act for a
mark that is incapable of distinguishing the goods it represents.
60
VII. FOREIGN LANGUAGE MARKS UNDER THE TRADEMARK ACT
Although English is the official language of the United States, there is
recognition of the multilingual character of consumers.6' The result of
this recognition is the doctrine of foreign equivalents, which requires
translation of foreign words to English prior to a determination of their
descriptiveness. 62 This is accomplished only for foreign words either from
major foreign languages or from languages spoken by groups of consumers
of the goods or services to which the words are applied.63 If this is not the
case, foreign words are only considered descriptive if they are similar to
their English equivalents, and these equivalents are descriptive.
64
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2).
56. Article 7(l)(d), the absolute grounds of refusal for marks that are customary
does not have a separate parallel in the Trademark Act. Such marks would be considered
as covered under the prohibition of registration of Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §
1052(e)(1), but have their closest parallel in the category of generic marks, which may be
cancelled under Section 14(3). 15 U.S.C. § 1064. This is the equivalent of the
procedure for cancellation of a Community trade mark that becomes the common name
for the good or service. Article 50(1)(b) CTMR.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).
58. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052-53.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1052. This is a parallel similar to that found between Article 4
CTMR and Article 7(1)(b) CTMR. See discussion supra note 43.
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).




VIII. SUMMARY OF CASE LAW UNDER THE TRADEMARK ACT
Cases under the law of the United States involving the treatment of
marks in a multilingual context are analyzed in Appendix 2. Notably,
distinctiveness in the United States is treated as a consideration
dependent on the characterization of a mark for descriptiveness or
"genericness," not a separate consideration.65
Courts in the United States examine the distinctiveness of a foreign
language trademark by first translating the mark into English, then by
categorizing the mark on the spectrum of distinctiveness.66 In addition,
the courts examine the usage of the mark in its country of origin.67
Marks that result from the combination of words from different
languages are not translated, but may be accepted as being suggestive,
arbitrary, or fanciful.68
IX. CONCLUSION
The trademark laws of the United States and the European Union each
have their advantages and disadvantages. The CTMR is an inherently
inward-looking regulation as regards its treatment of marks for their
linguistics. This treatment is more in depth than the treatment afforded
by the United States; the multilingual nature of the European Union
requires simultaneous examination of a proposed mark in all of the
languages of the Community rather than translation of the mark prior to
examination. The examination of the mark in several languages has the
advantage of precluding the registration of a mark that would be
descriptive or generic in part of the community. This examination has
the disadvantage of requiring the refusal of a mark because of
descriptiveness in pidgin.
The U.S. trademark law is an outward-looking one. The Doctrine of
Foreign Equivalents provides a means of examining proposed marks for
their descriptiveness or. genericness in foreign languages, without
restricting the languages examined. The examination is not applied to
composite marks, which may result in registration and protection of
marks that are actually generic in a foreign language.69 As a result,
65. Abercrombie & Fitch, Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
66. E.g., Enrique Bemat F., S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F.3d 439,443 (5th Cir. 2000).
67. E.g., Orto C6nserviera Sameranqse di Giacchetti Marino & Co. v. Bioconserve,
S.R.L., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 2013 (S.D.N.Y. '1999) affd 205 F.3d 1324 (2d Cir. 2000).
68. French Transit, Ltd. v. Modem Coupon Systems, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 635, 636
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
69. This may result when one of the words has meaning in both English and the
language of the remaining words. "La Yogurt" was arguably a mark of this nature. See In re
Johanna Farms Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1408 (T.T.A.B. 1988). Although not argued in this way,
[VOL. 4: 513, 2003] Trademark Distinctiveness
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J
registration and protection of marks that are descriptive or generic in
pidgin is possible.
The disparate treatment of distinctiveness between the European Union
and the United States is an additional area that requires harmonization. The
provision of Article 7(1)(b) CTMR adds nothing to the grounds on which a
mark may be refused; lack of a distinctive character for descriptiveness or
genericness is covered by Articles 7(1)(c) and (d) CTMR, while a lack of
distinctive character for other reasons would be covered by Article 7(1)(a)
CTMR. The examination of the distinctiveness of a mark with respect to its
goods or services clearly implicates an examination of descriptiveness or
genericness. A further examination with respect to the goods or services
related to a mark threatens the validity of suggestive marks, which are
considered deserving of greater protection under the U.S. trademark law.
X. THE WAY AHEAD
To render the protection to be afforded a mark predictable under the
Madrid Protocol the mechanisms for determination of the mark's
distinctiveness should be consistent. The Protocol allows for denial of
protection to foreign marks that meet criteria corresponding nearly
verbatim to the absolute grounds of refusal of the CTMR,70 and
invalidates an international registration if the original registration of
the mark is rejected, revoked, or invalidated.7 It is clear that the intent
of the Council in adopting the CTMR was to adopt the international bars
to protection of marks.72 The bars to the protection of marks under
European law diverge from the internationally accepted bars to
protection due to the interpretation of the phrase "devoid of distinctive
character" by the Court of First Instance as being related to particular
goods or services, 7 3 a proposition unsupported by the wording of the
"Pizzeria Uno" is another mark of this nature. See Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d
1522 (4th Cir. 1984) (protection of the word pizzeria was disclaimed by the mark owner
because it is generic, in English, for the type or restaurant for which the mark was registered).
70. THESE criteria are actually contained in the Paris Convention, which is
incorporated by reference in the Madrid Protocol. MADRID PROTOCOL, supra note 5, art.
5(1); PARIS CONVENTION, supra note 3, art. 6 quinquies; Articles 7(1)(b)-(d) CTMR.
71. MADRID PROTOCOL, supra note 5, art. 6(3).
72. Compare PARIS CONVENTION, supra note 3, art. 6 quinquies with Articles
7(1)(b)-(d) CTMR.
73. E.g., Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG, supra note 43, at para. 24. This
interpretation resulted from an imputation of the requirements of Article 4 CTMR into to
the requirements of Article 7(l)(b) CTMR, see discussion supra note 43.
Paris Convention.74 The protection of marks too closely related to their
particular goods or services is barred under European law by the
descriptive or generic nature of the mark; 75 there is no need for a
further examination of distinctiveness. European trademark law should
be harmonized with the international protection of marks through
elimination of Article 7(1)(b) CTMR, or the reinterpretation of this
Article by the European courts to exclude a reference to goods or
services in the determination of distinctiveness.
The current interpretation by the European courts presents several
logical problems, the first of which is the duplication of the bar to
registration of a mark for lack of distinctiveness by Articles 7(1)(a) and
(b) CTMR. Article 7(1)(a) CTMR bars registration of a mark that is not
capable of distinguishing goods and services of competitors by reference
to Article 4 CTMR;76 Article 7(1)(b) CTMR bars registration of "marks
which are devoid of any distinctive character. ' 77 The reference to the
requirements of Article 4 CTMR by Article 7(1)(a) CTMR is the source
of the interpretation that distinctiveness must be determined with respect
to the goods and services related to the mark.78 The parallel use of the
words "capable of distinguishing" and "distinctive" has resulted in the
inappropriate consideration of goods or services in a determination of
distinctiveness for the purposes of Article 7(l)(b) CTMR. The error of
this interpretation is highlighted by Article 7(3) CTMR, which allows
for an acquisition of distinctiveness to overcome the bar to registration
under Article 7(1)(b), but not Article 7(1)(a). 7 Clearly there must be
some difference between "marks which are devoid of any distinctive
character" 80 and marks that "are [in]capable of distinguishing the goods
or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings."'
The acquisition of distinctiveness under Article 7(3) CTMR presents
another logical problem with the CTMR. The Examination Guidelines
provide an example of a mark devoid of distinctive character in relation to
its goods, "wine" with respect to wine.82 This example is for a lack of
distinctiveness under Article 7(1)(b) CTMR.83 It is difficult to imagine this
74. PARIS CONVENTION, supra note 3, art. 6 quinquies.
75. Articles 7(1)(c)-(d) CTMR.
76. Articles 4, 7(l)(a) CTMR.
77. Article 7(l)(b) CTMR.
78. Case T-163/98, Procter & Gamble Co. v. OHIM, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2393,
paras. 20-21, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 1442; Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG, supra note
43, at paras. 23-24.
79. Article 7(3) CTMR.
80. Article 7(1)(b) CTMR.
81. Article 4 CTMR.
82. Examination Guidelines, supra note 9, at para. 8.3.
83. Id.
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word, which is generic with respect to wine, becoming distinctive with
respect to wine through use by one producer. An example that makes more
logical sense is a mark composed of one or two letters or numbers.84 The
mark "A-1"® is an example of one that could be considered to lack
distinctive character apart from. distinctiveness or genericness under the
CTMR, but has acquired distinctiveness through its use with condiments.8 5
XI. THE COMMUNITY TRADE MARK AND EXPANSION
The Community trade mark law, as it is currently administered, acts as a
sort of halfway house to the international registration envisioned by the
Madrid Protocol. A mark that qualifies as a Community trade mark would
meet the criteria for protection as they would be applied between the
member states of the Community. Taken as a snapshot, this is a desirable
situation for a business interested in protecting its marks. In the context of
enlargement of the Community, the picture becomes murkier.
The entry of new states into the European Union will result in
additional languages in which marks must be examined. This will result
in the need to examine new marks for descriptiveness, genericness, and
lack of a distinctive character in the new languages. 86 In the case of
marks whose registrations are pending, this examination will not be
conducted in the new languages.87  The generic nature of an existing
mark in the language of a new Member State will not provide a basis for
invalidation of the mark, but would allow fair use of the mark in the new
member state. 88  Absent one of the grounds for refusal of a mark,
Community trade mark rights automatically extend to new member
states.89 The result of this extension, with exceptions, is the creation of a
84. Id.
85. "A-1"®, a mark comprised of two letters or digits, is another example of a
mark lacking distinctiveness under Article 7(l)(b) CTMR provided in the Examination
Guidelines. Examination Guidelines, supra note 9, at para. 8.3. Of course, this mark
might be considered to be descriptive in nature of the quality of the goods or services, as
well as lacking a distinctive nature.
86. Articles 7(l)(b)-(d) CTMR.
87. Perspectives on Enlargement, OHIM DESIGNS AND ENLARGEMENT DIVISION, at
http://oami.eu.int/en/enlargement.swf (last visited Nov. 24, 2001).
88. Id. A similar result occurs for descriptive marks without an acquisition of
distinctiveness in the new member states. Id.
89. Id. A similar treatment exists for the grounds of refusal based on public
policy/morality. The grounds of refusal based on national emblems/hallmarks exists for
all national emblems/hallmarks due to the requirements of the PARIS CONVENTION, supra
note 3, art. 6 ter.
multi-tiered trademark protection regime throughout the Community
after enlargement. A simpler, and more desirable result is possible if the
Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents is applied to Community trade marks.
For example, Hungary is a candidate state for enlargement. Application
of the Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents. under U.S. trademark law
resulted in the cancellation of registration of the mark "Ha-Lush-Ka," a
phonetic spelling of the Hungarian word for noodles. 90 Under the
current policy for Community trade marks, "Ha-Lush-Ka" could be
registered in the European Union and retain trademark rights despite its
generic nature after enlargement of the Union to include Hungary. Such
an occurrence would seem to present problems for the free movement of
goods in the future.
OHIM should adopt the multiple language exception to the Doctrine of
Foreign Equivalents in examination of proposed Community trade marks.
The underlying reasons for refusing registration of a mark for its descriptive
or generic nature are to protect consumers' expectations and to allow
competing undertakings the right to call their goods and services by the
appropriate names.9' The Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents protects both
interests, when it is limited to the manner in which consumers and
competing undertakings communicate, in one language at a time. The
refusal of registration of a neologism as lacking distinctiveness due to an
interpretation of two English words combined under German rules of
grammar seems to miss the point of trademark law, the protection of
consumer expectations as to what is a trademark and what is not.
92
XII. LIMITATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF FOREIGN EQUIVALENTS
The application of the doctrine of foreign equivalents in U.S. trademark
law could be improved. This is particularly the case where a mark includes
words with meaning in both English and a foreign language, as in "La
Yogurt" or "Pizzeria Uno."93 While the multiple language exception to the
doctrine fills a purpose, harmonizing trademark law with human
communication, this purpose is served only when the application of the
exception is rationally limited. An appropriate limitation would exclude
marks that consist of words in one language with articles or numbers from
another language.
90. Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel and Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 846-
47 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
91. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., supra note 65, at 9.
92. See, e.g., Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG, supra note 43.
93. See discussions supra note 69; infra note 206. "Pizzeria Uno," if examined as
a Community trade mark would probably also be found lacking of distinctive character
under the CTMR, the equivalent of "Brand X" in English.
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XIII. TRIPS AND DISTINCTIVENESS
The upcoming negotiations of the World Trade Organization on the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
94
(TRIPS) may provide a mechanism for harmonization of the treatment of
distinctiveness in the Community trade mark and the Trademark Law
of the United States. Article 15 of this agreement provides the sole
requirement that a sign be capable of distinguishing the goods or
services of undertakings to constitute a trademark. 95 The sole clarification
of how a sign may be considered capable of distinguishing goods and
services is the allowance for the acquisition of distinctiveness for signs
that are not inherently distinctive.96  The weakness of the TRIPS
agreement is its lack of a definition of "signs [that] are not inherently
capable of distinguishing the relevant goods or services. 97 To correct
this weakness, and implement a rational treatment of marks in the
global, multilingual environment, the following clarification should be
added as Article 15(6) of TRIPS:
(6) Signs consisting of words are not inherently capable of distinguishing the
relevant goods or services if they may serve, in trade, to designate the kind,
quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, place of origin, or the time of
production, or have become customary in the current language or in the bona
fide and established practices of the trade of the country where protection is
claimed.
This addition corresponds to the appropriate portion of the Paris
Convention, 98 and will form the basis for an appropriate analysis of word
marks for distinctiveness based on their descriptive nature, leaving a
determination of distinctiveness for other reasons to signs that are not
words. The bona fide and established practices of the trade form the
basis for analysis of word marks in other major languages used in trade
with the country where trademark protection is sought and would,
reasonably interpreted, include a multiple language exception. It is a
bona fide and reasonable practice to use articles from one language with
words from another, but in general the use of multiple languages in a
single sentence should not be considered an established practice when
the "imported" words are not established in the "current" language.
94. TRIPS, supra note 7.
95. Id. art. 15 at para. 1.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. PARIS CONVENTION, supra note 5, art. 6 quinquies.
XIV. APPENDIX I-EUROPEAN UNION CASE LAW
An examination of the case law of the European Union regarding the
registration of Community trade marks is helpful in illustrating the
application of these regulations. Although the European Union is not
typically considered a common law jurisdiction, many of the cases
discussed below include citations to prior cases in a precedential
manner. This renders an examination of the case law almost a necessity.
A. Procter & Gamble Co. v. OHIM 99
This was an appeal from a refusal to register the mark "Baby-Dry" for
disposable diapers. 00 The grounds for refusal were the mark's lack of a
distinctive character and the mark's descriptive nature.'01 In the appeal
process before the Board of Appeals, the applicant had attempted to
prove that the mark had become distinctive through use, which would
overcome these grounds for refusal,'
0 2 but was not permitted to do so.'
0 3
The court analyzed the nature of the mark and found it to be
descriptive. 1°4 The opinion does not specifically address the lack of a
distinctive character, merely noting that the mark was not "capable of
distinguishing the applicant's goods from those of other undertakings."'
10 5
Ultimately, the court annulled the refusal of registration based on the
failure of the Board of Appeals to consider the acquisition of
distinctiveness through use.' 06 The failure of the court to address the
issue of distinctiveness itself presents some problems; a mark that is
devoid of distinctive character under Article 7(1)(b) CTMR may acquire
distinctiveness through use, while a mark that does not conform to the
requirements of Article 4 CTMR (being "capable of distinguishing the
goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings"),
10 7
cannot acquire distinctiveness through use.'08
99. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 78.
100. Id. at paras. 2-3.
101. Id. at para. 8.
102. Article 7(3) CTMR.
103. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 78, at para. 8.
104. Id. at paras. 22-26.
105. Id. at para. 27. This follows the wording of Article 4 CTMR, which is the
basis for the grounds of refusal of Article 7(l)(a) CTMR.
106. Id. at para. 54. Of note, the court does not have the power to remand the case
to the Board of Appeals for further consideration, leaving the final resolution of this case
to OHIM. Id. at para. 53.
107. Article 4 CTMR.
108. Article 7(3) CTMR allows acquisition of distinctiveness through use to
overcome the grounds for refusal of Articles 7(l)(b), (c), and (d).
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B. Ford Motor Co. v. OHIM 10 9
This case was an appeal from the OHIM Board of Appeals refusal to
register the mark "OPTIONS" as a Community trade mark for insurance,
warranty, financing, hire-purchase, and lease-purchase services.1"0 Registration
was refused by the examiner based on a lack of distinctive character in both
English and French."' Ford appealed to the Board of Appeals, asserting that
the mark had been used in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.11 2 The appeal to the OHIM Board of
Appeals, and the appeal here, argued that the acquisition of distinctiveness
through use in the Union would overcome the lack of distinctiveness in part
of the Union." 13 The court found for OHIM, clarifying that, to overcome a
refusal of registration for descriptiveness or lack of distinctiveness, acquired
distinctiveness must be demonstrated in those parts of the Community where
these grounds for refusal exist.
114
This case is notable for its demonstration of the interpretation of a proposed
mark in two different languages, English and French. It was not argued that
the mark was a word in English rather than French. This argument would
doubtless have failed because the examination for descriptiveness or
distinctiveness must be based on the perception of the mark by the consuming
public, which would obviously use French in member states using that
language. The case is also interesting in its failure to address English or French
speaking consumers in other portions of the Community, seemingly implying
that descriptiveness must be overcome by acquired distinctiveness in only
those Member States where the descriptiveness results in a native language." 5
109. Case T-91/99, Ford Motor Co. v. OHIM, 2000 E.C.R. 11-1925, [2000] 2
C.M.L.R. 276.
110. Id. at para. 3.
111. Id. at para. 4.
112. Id. at para. 5. The mark had been registered in Ireland, the United Kingdom, and
Benelux as a word mark (a mark consisting of the word itself, not a printed form of it). Id. at
para. 13. In the United Kingdom, this registration had required a demonstration of acquired
distinctiveness, the form of distinctiveness found lacking in the remainder of the Union by the
court in this case. Id. In Denmark, the mark was registered in a specific script form, not as a
word mark, lending credence to the classification of the mark as descriptive. See id. These
registrations are unaffected by the Community trade mark application and its refusal.
Registration as a Community trade mark would have allowed Ford to assert trade mark rights
in the mark throughout the Union based on a single registration, rather than requiring
individual registrations for the remaining member states.
113. Id. at para. 6, 9.
114. Id. at para. 27.
115. The opinion merely discusses descriptiveness of the mark in French, and a lack
of acquired distinctiveness through use in France. Id. at para. 28. The mark in question
C. Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG v. OHIM
116
This case was an appeal from the OHIM Board of Appeals refusal to
register the mark "EASYBANK" for on-line banking services.
1 7
Registration had been refused on the grounds that the mark was devoid
of distinctive character and was descriptive in nature." 8 The OHIM
Board of Appeals had found the mark descriptive with respect to two
separate groups of consumers, those in the English-speaking portion of
the European Union and those in the market targeted by the mark, who
"have knowledge of English, are abreast of the possibilities of modern
media and are interested in ... services offered by an on-line bank."' 19
The court disagreed, finding that the mark was not descriptive because it
did not describe the kind, quality, quantity, purpose, value, or any other
characteristics of the services offered, as required for a refusal on the
basis of descriptiveness.
20
The decision by the Board of Appeal that the mark was not distinctive
because it was descriptive was annulled based on the court's finding that
the mark was not descriptive,' 2' the basis cited by the Board of Appeals
for a finding of non-distinctiveness.
22
had been registered nationally in Ireland, a country where English is commonly spoken,
but no evidence of use there was presented. Id. at paras. 5, 14. Many consumers in other
portions of the Community also speak English, notably the large U.S. military presence
in Germany and Italy, but also ex patriots from English speaking Member States living
in other Member States as part of the consuming public.
116. Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG, supra note 42.
117. Id. at paras. 2, 6. The application for the trademark was initially for insurance,
financial affairs, monetary affairs, banking, banking services, and real estate affairs, but
was amended by the applicant. Id. at paras. 3, 6.
118. Id. at para. 7. Of note in this refusal, the lack of distinctive character was
based on the descriptive nature of the mark. Id. at para. 37. This directly contradicts the
principle that distinctiveness is independent of descriptiveness as espoused by Gastruel
and Milford in their treatise. GASTRUEL & MILFORD, supra note 28, at 71.
119. Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG, supra note 42, at paras. 25-26.
120. Id. at para. 29. These requirements are laid out in Article 7.1(c) CTMR, but
include the geographic origin or time of rendering of the service as well. Although the
mark might arguably be considered descriptive of another characteristic of the service,
the ease of use of the service is distinguishable from the example of such a characteristic
provided by Examination Guidelines for the Community trade mark, lead-free for petrol.
Examination Guidelines, supra note 9, at para. 8.4.1.
121. Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG, supra note 42, at 37-40.
122. Id. at para. 40. The result of this case was merely the annulment of the decision
of the OHIM Board of Appeals. The court did not address the subsequent actions to be
taken by OHIM, following the precedent of Procter & Gamble, in which it was established
that the requirement of Article 63.6 CTMR for OHIM to take "necessary measures to
comply with the judgment of the" court makes on order from the court unnecessary and
beyond the power of the court. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 78, at para. 53.
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D. Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG v. OHIM
123
This case was an appeal to the Court of the First Instance of the
OHIM Board of Appeals' refusal to register the mark "Companyline"
for insurance and financial affairs. 124 The basis for refusal of registration
was the lack of a distinctive nature for the mark. 2 5  The Board of
Appeals, and the court, found that the coupling of two words that are
customary in English-speaking countries without any graphic or
semantic modification would be insufficient to make the resulting sign
capable of distinguishing goods or services. 1
26
The decision is notable for what appears to be the application of
foreign grammar rules to English language marks. The official language
of this decision was German, as was Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft
AG, 127 but the treatment of the coupling of common English words in the
two cases, seems significantly different. This is more clearly seen in the
report of the Board of Appeals decision, which discusses the lack of
distinctiveness as being due to the use of a generic word with a second
word appended as a modifier to describe the services for which the
wortkombinationen is proposed as a mark. 128 Although there is some
logic to refusing registration of this mark based on the interpretation of
the mark by an English-speaking German consumer, the mark had
already been registered as a national trademark under German law.'
29
The mark was registered in Germany in 1996, and has probably acquired
distinctiveness there. Unfortunately, the acquisition of distinctiveness to
overcome a lack of distinctive character must hold true throughout the
Community. 3° If a neologism consisting of the combination of two
English words must be analyzed as it would be perceived by the English-
speaking German population and found to lack distinctiveness based on
123. Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG, supra note 43.
124. Id. at paras. 2-3.
125. Id. at para. 27-29.
126. Id. at para. 26.
127. Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG, supra note 42.
128. Case R-72/1998-1, Deutsche Krankenversicherungs' Application, available in
both English and German at http://oami.eu.int (last visited Feb. 12, 2003). This is an
example of the formation of compound words in German. Compound "words [are]
formed by combining two or more separate words. Some of these compounds,
particularly the long ones, are not listed in dictionaries." ERNST KOCH & FRANCIS J.
NOCK, ESSENTIALS OF GERMAN 192 (1957). See also APRIL WILSON, GERMAN QUICKLY:
A GRAMMAR FOR READING GERMAN 126 (1993).
129. Deutsche Krankenversicherungs' Application, supra note 128.
130. Ford Motor Co., supra note 109, at para. 27.
German construction of a wortkombinationen, then surely a similar
analysis would be necessary to account for the perception of the
neologism by the German-speaking English population. This general
rule would require the examination of neologisms proposed as marks
applying the grammatical rules of all of the community's languages to
words from those languages without regard to their origin.
E. Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG v. OHIM I1 3'
This case is another appeal by Deutsche Krankenversicherungs of a
Board of Appeal refusal to register a Community trade mark, in this case
"EuroHealth" for insurance and financial affairs.132 The examiner had
refused registration of the mark on grounds of a lack of distinctive
character; 133 this was amended by the Board of Appeals to include
descriptiveness.' 34  The court agreed that the term "EuroHealth" was
descriptive in English of health insurance in Europe, 35 but held that it
was not descriptive of financial affairs.' 36 The refusal of registration of
the mark was annulled in so far as it applied to financial affairs., 37 The
court examined the determination of the Board of Appeals that the mark
was not distinctive and found it to be based solely on the descriptive
nature of the mark, 38 as was the determination of the Board of Appeals
in Bank fur A rbeit und Wirtschaft. 1
39
131. Case T-359/99, Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG v. OHIM, [2001]
E.T.M.R. 81 [hereinafter Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG II].
132. This appeal was from a refusal by the same Board of Appeals as that in the
earlier case. Id. at para. 6; Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG, supra note 43, at para.
8. The appeals were heard by different chambers of the Court of First Instance; in this
case the Second Chamber, which included a Dutch judge and a German judge
(nationalities of the judges were determined from the information available at
http://curia.eu.int/en/pres/cvtp.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002); one of the judges listed in
the opinion is no longer on the court, but the only new judge since this opinion was
written is French. Id.). Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG I1, supra note 131. The
earlier case had been heard by the Fourth Chamber, which consisted of a Portuguese
judge, a Finnish judge, and an Italian judge.
133. Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG 11, supra note 131, at para. 4.
134. Id. at para. 7.
135. Id. at para. 27. Euro is descriptive of the geographic location in which the
services would be rendered, and Health is descriptive of the kind of insurance. Id. at
para. 26.
136. Id. at para. 37.
137. Id. at para. 50.
138. Id. at para. 46.
139. Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG, supra note 42, at paras. 37-40. Both of
these cases were decided by the same chamber of the court. Id.; Deutsche
Krankenversicherungs AG 11, supra note 13 1.
[VOL. 4: 513, 2003] Trademark Distinctiveness
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
F. Community Concepts AG v. OHIM114
0
This case, another appeal of an OHIM Board of Appeals refusal to
register a mark, also involved a mark formed by connecting two
common English words. The mark was "INVESTORWORLD" for
insurance, financial business, monetary (currency) affairs, and property
services. 14 1  The mark was refused registration on grounds of
descriptiveness and being devoid of distinctive character. 142 On appeal,
OHIM acknowledged that the mark was not descriptive. 43 The court
found the mark to be devoid of distinctive character, following the
reasoning of Deutsche Krankenversicherungs.
144
The result of this case presents some problems in deriving the rule to
be applied in determining whether or not a combination of words is
distinctive. The mark was registered as a Community trade mark for
products and services other than those involved in this appeal. 145 OHIM
and the court acknowledged that the mark was not descriptive, 146 but
found that it was not distinctive with relation to certain goods and
services while it was distinctive with respect to other goods and
services.147 The result is a need to hold the distinctive character of a
mark, based on the goods or services to which it refers, to a stricter
standard than mere descriptiveness. It appears that this result would
prevent the registration of marks that are suggestive in nature.1
48
These last four cases may be reconciled by examining the bases for
their outcomes. The marks "Companyline" and "INVESTORWORLD"
were found to be devoid of distinctive character by both the OHIM
Board of Appeals and the Court of First Instance for reasons other than a
descriptive nature. 149 The reason underlying this lack of a distinctive
character was the combination of two words that lack distinctiveness in
140. Community Concepts AG, supra note 43.
141. Id. at paras. 2-3.
142. Id. at paras. 4, 8. Registration of the mark had been allowed in connection
with a variety of other products and services not discussed in the opinion. Id. at para. 7.
143. Id. at para. 14.
144. See id.
145. Id. at para. 7.
146. Id.
147. Id. at paras. 21-25.
148. Such marks are inherently distinctive, and registrable, under the trademark law
of the United States. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., supra note 65. The categories of marks
used in the case law of the United States is discussed below.
149. Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG, supra note 43; Community Concepts AG,
supra note 43.
relation to the goods or services offered. 50  The marks "EuroHealth"
and "EASYBANK," on the other hand, had not been found to lack
distinctive character by the OHIM Board of Appeals on any basis other
than a descriptive nature.. This leaves the decision to annul the Board of
Appeals action in these two cases appearing to be based more on
procedural problems in the refusal to register the marks than substantive
problems of the'marks actually being distinctive. 15' The determination
that a mark is not distinctive must be based on a lack of a distinctive
quality separate from the descriptive nature of the mark.
G. Sunrider Corp. v. OHIM
152
The mark refused registration in this case was "VITALITE" for use
with a wide variety of goods. 153 The Board of Appeals had refused
registration because the mark could be read as the French word
"vitalit6,"'' 54 and would therefore be descriptive and lack distinctiveness
for many of the goods. 55 The court affirmed this action for the majority
of the goods on the basis of descriptiveness, but annulled the action with
respect to the goods baby food and mineral and aerated water.
56
The reason the mark was found to be descriptive for the goods was their
common nature; all of the goods were to be used for medical, nutritional,
or dietetic reasons. 57  It is not wrong to conclude that the intended
purpose of these goods is to provide renewed vitality; 58 this meets the
criteria for exclusion under Article 7(1)(c) CTMR. OHIM argued that the
mark would describe baby food, which is "preservative-free or contain[s]
added vitamins and minerals.' 59  The court rejected this argument,
finding that the mark was merely evocative of these characteristics.
60
150. Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG, supra note 43, at para. 26; Community
Concepts AG, supra note 43, at paras. 21-25.
151. See Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG I1, supra note 131; Bank fur Arbeit
und Wirtschaft AG, supra note 42.
152. Case T-24/00, Sunrider Corp. v. OHIM, 2001 E.C.R. 1-449, [2001] E.T.M.R. 56.
153. Id. at paras. 2-3.
154. Id. at para. 8. This reading is possible because capital letters in French are not
normally depicted with the accents they would have in lower case. Id. The meaning of
the word "vitalit6" is vitality in English. Id.
155. The Board of Appeals permitted registration for milk products and drinks
made of milk. Id. at paras. 8, 23.
156. Id. at paras. 26, 30, 35.
157. Id. at para. 25. The goods included pharmaceutical preparations, herbal foods
and beverages, and nutritional supplements. Id. at para. 8.
158. Id. at para. 25.
159. Id. at para. 22.
160. Id. at para. 22. OHIM additionally argued "such food can give life force or
vitality to babies." Id. at para. 22. This would appear to be the equivalent of the purpose
of the food, the designation of which by the mark is prohibited by Article 7.1 (c) CTMR.
The distinction between baby food and the goods for which the mark was refused might
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With respect to mineral and aerated water, OHIM pointed out the common
use of health, sport, and a general sense of well-being in advertising,
which would render the mark descriptive.' 61 The court rejected this
argument as demonstrating that the mark would be suggestive of an image
attributed to the goods rather than their purpose. 1
62
The court annulled the finding of the Board of Appeals that the mark
was devoid of distinctive character with respect to baby food and
mineral and aerated water because it was based solely on the mark's
descriptive character. 63  However, it did not clearly address the
distinctiveness of the mark with relation to the goods for which it was
refused registration.
The applicant argued that the mark was registered as a trademark in
fifteen countries in Europe, twelve of which were Member States, and
therefore registration should be permitted. 64 The court rejected this
argument due to the difference between the Community trade mark
registration and the nature of the mark as registered, and the goods for
which it was registered, in the national registrations. 65 The applicant could
have argued that prior use of the mark, rather than prior registration, with
respect to the goods resulted in acquisition' of distinctiveness and
overcame the mark's descriptiveness.' 
66 This argument was not offered. 167
H. Taurus-Film GmbH & Co. v'.'OHIM
161
The mark refused registration in this case was "CINE ACTION" for a wide
variety of goods and services involving entertainment.169  The basis for
refusal to register the mark was a lack of distinctiveness and the
descriptiveness of the mark. The court affirmed the action of the Board of




163. Id. at para. 29.
164. Id. at para. 31. This argument was offered based on the preamble of an earlier
Council Directive, which stated that the protection of registered trade marks of one member
state should be provided in other member states to promote the free movement of goods.
Id. at para. 32. See also, First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, 1989 O.J. (LAO).
165. Id. at para. 34.
166. Article 7.3 CTMR
167. See Sunrider Corp., supra note 152.
168. See Taurus-Film GmbH & Co., supra note 44.
169. Id. at paras. 2, 10.
Appeals with respect to many of the goods and services for which registration
of the mark was requested,'70 finding that "CINE" would mean film or cinema
to speakers of English, French, Italian, and German. 171 The combination of
"CINE" and "ACTION" would therefore have the meaning "action film" and
be descriptive of the goods and services with the exception of those not
involving action films.' 72 Although the word "action" is native to the English
tongue, and the word "cine" was found to signify film in English by the court
and the Board of Appeals, 173 it does not appear to be entirely clear that "CINE
ACTION" would mean action films in English. This finding seems the result
of the application of a multilingual interpretation of the phrase.
The court's discussion of the problem of a distinctive nature for the mark is
based entirely on the descriptive nature of the mark. 174 OHIM's refusal to
register the mark was annulled with respect to those goods not involving action
films because the descriptiveness of the mark for action films would not render
the mark void of distinctiveness for these goods.175 The court's analysis of the
distinctiveness of the mark resembled that conducted for the marks
"EuroHealth" and "EASYBANK," with the annulment of a finding of non-
distinctiveness resulting from the reliance on descriptiveness of the mark.1
76
L Harcourt Brace & Co. 's Application
177
This case is an appeal before the First Board of Appeal for OHIM of
the examiner's refusal to register the mark "IDEAL" for access to an
electronic database of journal articles. 178  The examiner refused
registration of the mark due to a lack of distinctiveness because it
170. Id. at para. 26.
171. Id. at paras. 19, 26.
172. Id. at paras. 26, 28. These goods and services included rights of access to
communication networks, quiz shows, technical consulting, etc. Id. at para. 28. The
Board of Appeals had found that the word "ACTION" was used colloquially in modem
German to mean "action film," which would render the mark in German "a clear and
unmistakable indication of ... action films." Id. at para. 8. This reasoning would
support a refusal of registration under Article 7(l)(d) CTMR for which colloquial usage
seems more apt. Article 7(1)(d) CTMR.
173. Id. at para. 26.
174. See id. at paras. 22-25, 30, 31.
175. Id. atpara. 31.
176. Of note, all of these marks were examined by the Second Chamber of the Court of
First Instance, and the marks "Companyline" and "INVESTORWORLD" had been examined
by the Fourth Chamber of the court. Id.; Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG, supra note 42;
Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG, supra note 43; Deutsche Krankenversicherungs AG II,
supra note 131; Community Concepts AG, supra note 43. Although it is possible that the
disparate results are due to the examination by different chambers, the citation of precedent in
all of these opinions demonstrates a leaning towards common law principles that argues for
unification of the rule to be derived from the cases.
177. Case R 130/1999-1, Harcourt Brace & Co.'s Application, [2000] E.T.M.R. 382.
178. Id. at 385.
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described the services for which the mark was applied. 179 The appeal
was based on acquired distinctiveness of the mark, and the nature of the
mark as an acronym rather than a word.180
The Board of Appeals upheld the action of the examiner in refusing
registration of the mark for its descriptiveness and lack of
distinctiveness, but remitted the case to the examiner for a determination
of acquired distinctiveness.1 81 The Board found descriptiveness in the
mark by referring to the dictionary definitions of "ideal" in English,
German, Spanish, and Portuguese; these definitions pointed to the use of
the word in all of the languages as descriptive of the high quality of the
item being described. 82 The mark was found to lack distinctiveness
because "it cannot distinguish one undertaking's services from those of
other undertakings which might also wish to emphasis the superior
quality of their services. ' 83 The Board rejected the characterization of
the mark as an acronym because this ruling would have allowed
registration of any non-distinctive or descriptive mark merely by arguing
that the mark is an acronym.'
84
XV. APPENDIX 2-CASE LAW UNDER THE TRADEMARK ACT
OF THE UNITED STATES
Because of the common law tradition of the United States, it is
necessary to examine the case law to fully understand the law of the
United States. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,
85
provides the conceptual framework followed in the assessment of
distinctiveness of a mark. Distinctiveness is evaluated along a spectrum
ranging from generic as the least distinctive, to descriptive, suggestive,
179. Id. This refusal was under Article 7(1)(b) CTMR, distinctiveness, rather than
Article 7(1)(c) CTMR, descriptiveness, for reasons that are not clear in the report.
180. Id. at 388. "IDEAL" is an acronym for "International Digital Electronic
Access Library." Id. at 388. The appeal also stated that "IDEAL" could be applied to
any good or service and would not be descriptive of the service applied for. Id. This
does not address the descriptiveness of the quality of the service, which would be
grounds for refusal of registration under Article 7(1)(c) CTMR.
181. Id. at391-99.
182. id. at391.
183. Id. This phrasing of the lack of distinctive character of the mark is lifted
almost verbatim from Article 4 CTMR, which describes signs that may be used as
Community trade marks. Article 4 CTMR.
184. Id. at391-92.
185. Abercrombie & Fitch, Co., supra note 65.
and finally arbitrary or fanciful as the most distinctive.'86  The
assessment of a mark's place on the spectrum provides the basis for
determining the protection available to marks in foreign languages as
well as English language marks.
A. Otokoyama Co. Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc.' 87
The plaintiff in this case was the owner of four trademarks for the word
"otokoyama", and won a preliminary injunction against use of the mark by
the defendant. 88 The defendant counterclaimed, seeking cancellation of the
trademarks. 189 The District Court excluded evidence that "otokoyama" is a
generic term in Japanese for a type of sake. 190 The Court of Appeals held
the exclusion of this evidence an error, applied the Doctrine of Foreign
Equivalents, and vacated the granting of the preliminary injunction.191
B. Orto Conserviera Sameranese di Giacchetti Marino & Co. v.
Bioconserve, S.R.L.
192
This case involved the use of the phrase "Bella di Cerignola" as a
trademark for a type of olive grown in the vicinity of the town Cerignola in
the province of Puglia, Italy.' 93 The court examined evidence that established
the phrase was used in Italy for this type of olive, rendering this phrase
generic for the olives.' 94 The court alternatively found the phrase descriptive;
186. Id. at 9. Of note, this opinion provides a discussion of the genesis of the
suggestive category, which is missing in the CTMR. In the trademark law of the United
States prior to the current Trademark Act, acquisition of distinctiveness was not possible
for marks that were merely descriptive. Id. at 10. The courts created the category of
suggestive marks to overcome this obstacle for marks that seemed neither descriptive nor
fanciful, but required "imagination, thought andperception to reach a conclusion as to
the nature of [the] goods.'. Id. at 10-11 (quoting Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants
& Manufacturers Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
187. Otokoyama Co. Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc, 175 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 1999).
188. Id. at 268-69. The four separate trademarks were in the word "otokayama"
depicted in the three Japanese writing systems, Kanji (Chinese characters), Katakana
(Japanese phonetic characters), and Hiragana (Japanese phonetic characters for foreign
words), as well as in the English transliteration (Romaji). Id. at 269.
189. Id. at 268.
190. Id. at 269. This type of sake is specifically a "dry, manly sake." Id. at 271.
191. Id. at 270. The defendants had also argued that the registration of the trademarks
had been obtained fraudulently due to the refusal of the plaintiff to supply translations of the
marks. Id. at 269, 273. The district court ultimately decided the case in favor of the
defendants on the grounds that the mark was generic; this decision was affirmed on appeal.
Otokoyama Co. LTD., v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 7 Fed. Appx. 112 (2d Cir. 2001).
192. Orto Conserviera Sameranese di Giacchetti Marino & Co., supra note 67.
193. Id. at 2013. It is not clear from the opinion what the plaintiffs and defendants
sought, merely that the defendants had applied for the trademark and counterclaimed
against the plaintiffs' suit for unfair competition, false marketing, and trademark misuse.
194. Id.
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"one need not be an Italian scholar to recognize that 'Bella di Cerignola'
means beauty of or from Cerignola."'195 In either case, the mark fell too low
on the spectrum of distinctiveness to warrant protection. This seems an
application of the Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents, with the court treating
Italian as a major foreign language.
C. Enrique Bernat F., S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc.1
96
The defendant in this case appealed a preliminary injunction forbidding
the sale of "Chupa Gurts", a frozen-yogurt flavored type of lollipop, due to
the similarity with the plaintiff's registered trademark "Chupa Chups" for
lollipops.197 The court of appeals examined the use of the word "chupa" in
a variety of Spanish speaking countries, and found that it was commonly
used to refer to lollipops. 198 Because "chupa" is a generic term, the Doctrine
of Foreign Equivalents prevents the granting of trademark protection to this
portion of the mark. 199 The court of appeals vacated the granting of a
preliminary injunction by the district court as an abuse of discretion because
it had been based on an erroneous likelihood of confusion analysis
comparing "Chupa Chups" and "Chupa Gurts" rather than comparing the
non-generic portions of the two marks, "Chups" and "Gurts." 200
D. Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple
20 1
The plaintiff in this case brought suit for infringement of the registered
trademark "Pizzeria Uno" against the proprietor of "Taco Uno", a mark
for which registration was sought.20 2 The district court had found the
registered mark to be merely descriptive and therefore not entitled to
protection absent a showing of secondary meaning.20 3 The district court
195. Id. Of course, it is helpful to be an Italian scholar, or at least familiar with the
Italian language.
196. Enrique Bemat F., S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F.3d 439, (5th Cir. 2000).
197. Id. at441.
198. Id. at 443-44. The district court had found that "chupa" primarily meant "to
lick" or "to suck", but failed to address the common or slang usage of the term. Id. at 443.
199. Id. at 445.
200. Id.
201. Pizzeria Uno Corp., supra note 69.
202. Id. at 1524-25.
203. Id. at 1526. This finding was based on the decision of the trademark examiner
to publish the second mark, which would allow an opportunity for comment by anyone
who believed they would be damaged by the use of the mark. Id. at 1525.
found an absence of secondary meaning, and held for the defendant.2°
The Court of Appeals reversed this holding, finding that the mark
"Pizzeria Uno" was suggestive rather than descriptive.205  This reversal
was based, in part, on application of the Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents;
"uno" is not descriptive of "the best" pizzeria or taco stand.2°6
This opinion is more valuable for its discussion of the limitations on
the Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents than it is for its result. These
limitations arise when a foreign word or phrase is commonly used in
English with a meaning different than its literal meaning. 207 Thus, the
French word "Repechage" and the French phrase "Le Cordon Bleu" are
not the equivalent of "Second Chance" and "Blue Ribbon," their
respective literal translations.20 8  The Doctrine seems to have other
limitations not discussed in this opinion; the Doctrine requires a showing
of secondary meaning, or acquired distinctiveness, for foreign words that
are descriptive, but does not clearly specify where this must be shown.
E. In re Joha.nna Farms, Inc.
209
This case involved an appeal of the refusal to register the mark "LA
YOGURT".'0 The registration had been refused based on the generic
nature of the mark in French.21' The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
found that the mark was not generic in French because it was a
combination of an American-English word combined with the French
article "la. ' 212  Combining words from different languages creates a
different commercial impression and renders Doctrine of Foreign
Equivalents inapplicable to the resulting mark.21 3
The inapplicability of the Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents to marks
resulting from a combination of languages had been established in prior
204. Id. at 1526.
205. Id. at 1533.
206. Id. The district court had found that "uno" is commonly used in the English
language, apparently with the colloquial meaning "the best" due to the presence of the
word in a dictionary. The appellate court looked in the dictionary cited and found that
the meaning in the main portion was "United Nations Organization," while the Italian
word "uno" is translated in the Italian-English section as the article a or an, and the
number one. Id. at 1533.
207. See id. at 1532.
208. Id. (discussing In re Sarkli, Ltd., 721 F.2d 353 (Fed. Cir. 1983) and
Continental Nut Co. v. Le Cordon Bleu, 494 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1974)).
209. In re Johanna Farms Inc., supra note 69.
210. Id. at 1409.
211. Id. The proper generic word for "the yogurt" in French would be "le yogurt".
Id. at 1414 (Simms, Member, dissenting).
212. Id. at 1413.
213. See id. at 1413.
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cases, 214 but seems a weak argument in this case due to the fact that
yogurt is also a French word.215 It was merely the fact that an improperly
gendered article was used in the phrase that enabled the mark to be
registered.21 6  Allowing registration of a mark based on improper
application of grammatical rules of the language of the mark to its
construction seems improper.21 7 This is particularly troublesome when
the grammatical error is the use of an incorrect article, a not wholly
uncommon occurrence in everyday speech.
F. French Transit, Ltd. v. Modem Coupon Sys., Inc.218
The defendant in this trademark infringement suit moved for summary
judgment that the registered mark "LE CRYSTAL NATUREL" was
descriptive and therefore invalid. 2 19 This argument was based on application
of the Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents.22' The court declined to apply
this Doctrine under the reasoning of In re Johanna Farms, Inc. because
the mark consisted of one English word and two French words, 221 and
denied the motion for summary judgment.
222
ERIC E. BOWMAN
214. See, e.g., In re Universal Package Corp., 222 U.S.P.Q. 344 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
215. See In re Johanna Farms, Inc., supra note 69, at 1411. Although the Board
recognized that the "yogurt" is a word in French as well as English, the Board treated the
word as English.
216. Id. at 1414 (Simms, Member, dissenting).
217. Id. (Simms, Member, dissenting). The result of this case is rendered further
suspect by examination of the mark in Italian. The word yogurt is a foreign word
imported to the Italian language for which the feminine article is used. The phrase "la
yogurt" would therefore be generic in Italian.
218. French Transit, Ltd., supra note 68.
219. Id. at 636-37.
220. Id. at 636.
221. Id. The French word for "crystal" is "cristal".
222. Id. at 640.
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